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"MULTICOPY" Dwb«\ 
INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION UNDER APARTHEID : 
THE RELOCATION OF INDUSTRY TO THE SOOTH AFRICAN PHUPHERY 
Summary - This paper is concerned with industrial decentralisation in 
South A f r i c a . Central to i t i s an ana lys is of the impact of 
d ecen t ra l i sa t i on on i ndus t r i a l i s a t i on in the bantustans. Hie f i r s t 
sec t ion descr ibes the evo lut ion of the decen t ra l i sa t i on po l i c y and 
examines the r esu l t s to date. Par t i cu lar a t t en t i on is d i rec ted 
towards the rev ised programme introduced in 1982. Sect ion two 
i d e n t i f i e s the p o l i t i c a l imperat ives that have underpinned the 
programme since i t s inception and discusses the a l t e r n a t i v e thes is 
that a dr ive towards 'spontaneous' decentralisation may have emerged 
more recent ly . The th i rd sec t ion , drawing upon the r esu l t s of the 
authors' two surveys, focuses upon the factors that mi l i ta te against 
the development of growth points in the bantustans. This shows that 
most are severe ly disadvantaged with respect to growth points 
es tab l ished in 'whi te ' areas and may t h e r e f o r e be l a r g e l y excluded 
from any 'spontaneous' d r i v e towards decen t ra l i sa t i on . F ina l l y , 
section four demonstrates that the supposed 'developmental' impact of 
decentralisation on the bantustan sub-economies is extremely l imited, 
with most of the benef its draining back to the metropolitan centres. 
IOTROCXJCTION 
Although indust r ia l decen t ra l i sa t i on has been cent ra l to South 
Afr ica 's bantustan strategy for over twenty years, i t has encountered 
- to c i t e one o f f i c i a l understatement - " re la t i ve ly l i t t l e success"^-
in revers ing the trend towards the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of manufacturing 
production. An explanation for this i s not d i f f i c u l t to find. Whilst 
there have been many attempts to rat ional ise decentralistion on sound 
economic grounds - and the re f o re to see i t as a so lu t i on to both 
a l l e g ed metropol i tan diseconomies and the underdevelopment of the 
periphery - i t was clear from the outset that "...the genuine economic 
cause f o r decen t ra l i sa t i on was subordinated to the requirements of 
separate development".2 Spec i f i ca l ly , decentralisation was conceived 
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as a means f o r s t a b i l i s i n g the s ta t e ' s system of in f lux contro l by 
providing alternatives to metropolitan employment within the bantustan 
sub-economies. On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest 
that an economic imperat ive favouring decen t ra l i sa t i on may have 
emerged more recently. Although the data may as yet be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, i t is possible to argue that South Africa is in the 
ea r l y stages of a reorganisat ion of industrial production towards a 
regional div is ion of labour - spec i f i ca l l y , the relocation of labour-
intensive processes to peripheral cheap labour areas - as a means for 
improving i t s l imited competitiveness with respect to both imported 
manufactures and i t s own exports to the international markets. 
Given these two pos i t i ons , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to evaluate the rev ised 
decen t ra l i sa t i on programme that the government introduced in April 
1982. Whi ls t i t would appear that the government i n i t i a t i v e s have 
g ene ra t ed much g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t in d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n among 
industralists than at any time before, there are at least two possible 
interpretations of these early results. On the one hand, an increase 
in the number of applications for decentralisation may r e f l e c t nothing 
more than an appreciation of the improved incentives now avai lable at 
the growth points. On the other , one might suggest that the new 
po l i c y has simply fastened on to a 'spontaneous' d r i v e towards the 
relocation of irrlustry to low wage areas. 
This paper, however, w i l l not attempt to v a l i da t e e i ther of these 
hypotheses. For one thing, i t i s as ye t too ea r l y to p ro j e c t with 
conf idence poss ib l e react ions to decen t ra l i sa t i on in the future . 
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Secondly, i t i s impossib le to tes t with any r ea l prec is ion the 
assumption of the second hypothesis that decentralisation would occur 
on a l a rge sca le in the absence of incent i ves . Hence, what i s 
assessed here is the contribution that decentralisation might make to 
the industrialisation of the bantustans, given that this remains the 
predominant o f f i c a l object ive of the policy. In sharp contrast to the 
propaganda issued fol lowing the early successes of the 1982 programme, 
we argue that most bantustan growth points are severely disadvantaged 
wi th respect to those located in 'wh i te ' areas - a f a c t that i s 
c lear ly re f lected in the pattern of decentralisation since 1982 - and 
that they w i l l the r e f o r e be l a r g e l y excluded from any 'spontaneous' 
d r i v e towards industr ia l r e l oca t i on . In add i t i on , we show that 
decentralisation has very l i t t l e impact upon the 'development' of the 
bantustan sub-economies either in terms of the creation of employment 
opportunities or through local mult ipl ier e f f e c t s . 
We would s t r ess , though, that our o b j e c t i v e here i s not to suggest 
amendments to the programme that might fur ther i t s 'developmental ' 
impact f o r th is would be to accept the l e g i t imacy of the bantustans 
and the ideo logy that created them. Further, i t would imply that 
planning fo r the b e n e f i t of the impoverished i s (or could be) a 
meaningful process in these areas - " that i s to say, w i th in a t o t a l 
s oc i a l and p o l i t i c a l context which makes such planning at best 
irrelevant and at worst a del iberate attempt to d iver t attention from 
the r e a l i t i e s of power".3 Thus, wh i l s t planners might wish to see 
what could be done within the existing po l i t i ca l framework to improve 
conditions in the bantustans, they should also consider to what extent 
their recommendations are l ike ly to strengthen those structures which 
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(1973b, pp. 401-402), the funct ion of the growth points was two fo ld : 
" (a) to provide people in the surrounding labour supply areas of the 
Bantu homelands with the opportunity of commuting to jobs in 
manufacturing industry in the growth centres , and (b) to d i f f u s e 
benef its thoughout the surrounding areas via some sort of income and 
employment m u l t i p l i e r mechanism". However, the border areas were 
never more than marg ina l ly success ful in a t t r ac t ing investment and 
their impact upon development within the bantustans proved negl igible. 
Accordingly, and in response to the accelerating deterioration of the 
bantustan sub-economies, a dec is ion was taken in 1968 to permit 
'white' capital into the bantustans although this had previously been 
thought inconsistent with the ideo logy of 'separate development'. 
Simultaneously, the Physical ( l a t e r , Environment) Planning Act was 
introduced in 1967 to provide fo r s t r i c t e r contro l over industr ia l 
expansion in the metropol i tan centres of Pre tor ia -Wi twatersrand-
Vereenig ing (PWV), Port El izabeth-Uitenhage, Bloemfontein and Cape 
Town. In terms of the Act , r e s t r i c t i o n s were placed on both the 
proclamation of industrial land (Section 2) and extensions to existing 
factor ies (Section 3), both pieces of l eg is la t ion being spec i f i ca l l y 
designed to regulate the employment of Africans. 
The exact impact of this policy is d i f f i c u l t to gauge with precision 
but i t i s clear that i t had important implications for job creation in 
the metropolitan areas, while having very l i t t l e e f f e c t on industrial 
development in the bantustans.5 There were several reasons for this. 
In the f i r s t p lace , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s could respond to coe rc i v e 
leg is lat ion in several ways besides relocation; (a) by deciding not to 
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expand at a l l 6 - indeed Glasec (1983, p.24) sugges t s tha t 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s staged a "general investment s t r i k e " in the years 
immediately fol lowing promulgation of the Act; (b) by expanding with 
the use of non-African labour; and (c) by increasing production 
through the subst i tut ion of c ap i t a l f o r labour.7 Secondly, some 
companies decided to c lose down rather than run p o t e n t i a l l y 
uncompetitive businesses on s i t e or face the risks of relocation. Hie 
t e x t i l e s and c loth ing industry, f o r example, ac tua l l y contracted 
between 1968 and 1978 in PWV p r imar i l y as a r esu l t of the Act . 8 
Thi rd ly , companies were able to expand operat ions in Natal where 
metropolitan areas were f ree from controls.^ Final ly, the incentives 
were generally not considered attract ive enough to compensate for the 
disadvantages of growth point locations. 
Reactions to the Act amongst i ndus t r i a l i s t s were character ised by 
"consternation, confusion and protest".-'-® As a result, the government 
decided in 1971 to confine Section 2 controls to PWV only arri to l i f t 
Sect ion 3 r e s t r i c t i o n s on industr ies de f ined as e i ther ' l o c a l i t y -
bound' or labour-intensive with respect to white workers. In spite 
of th i s , though, and desp i te the f a c t that the rate of r e fusa l of 
applications made under the Act between 1968 and 1978 stood at only 10 
pe rcen t , 1 1 r e j e c t i o n s under Sect ions 2 and 3 s t i l l a f f e c t e d about 
220 000 and 100 000 jobs r e spec t i v e l y in th i s per iod, discounting 
p o s s i b l e l o s s e s in j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h r ough c a p i t a l 
subst i tut ion/c losures and f a i l u r e s to expand.12 On the other hand, 
o f f i c i a l f igures tend to overstate the 'posit ive ' impact of the policy 
s ince a considerable proport ion of jobs would have emerged at the 
growth points independently of s ta te in tervent ion. Thus, on the 
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assumption that non-metropolitan areas would have at least retained a 
constant share of employment, Bell (1973a) argued that only 11 600 out 
of 87 000 jobs generated at growth points in the 1960's (roughly 13 
percent) were products of government po l i c y . Arguing along s imi la r 
l ines, Gottschalk (1977, p.54) calculates that in the f i r s t f i v e years 
of the po l i c y from 1968, an average 9,2 jobs were l o s t in the 
metropol i tan centres f o r every one created in the growth points . 
Thus, despite periodic revisions of the incentive packages obtaining 
at growth po ints , o f f i c i a l sources ind ica te that only 192 990 jobs 
were decentralised between 1960 and 1981.13 Of these, about 150 000 
were decentralised to border and bantustan growth points (1960-1980) -
an annual average of 7 500 - whereas an average 115 000 blacks were 
e n t e r i n g the labour f o r c e in these a reas e v e r y year.-*-^ Not 
surpr i s ing l y , then, decen t ra l i sa t i on p o l i c y was restructured once 
again with the introduction of a new programme on 1st April 1982. 
Unlike previous amendments to the system t h i s c on ta ins some 
s i g n i f i c a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s . In the f i r s t p l a c e , w h i l s t 
industrialisation within the bantustans is s t i l l regarded as the major 
p r i o r i t y of the programme (and th is i s r e f l e c t e d in the l e v e l of 
incent ives o f f e r e d at bantustan growth po in t s ) , the l e v e l of 
ass is tance is a lso structured in accordance with the 'development' 
needs of ( e ight ) ' funct iona l reg ions ' which cut across bantustan 
borders. Second, while the number of growth points has increased, the 
stated intent ion i s to focus incent ives on a more l im i t ed number of 
po ints . Third, the incent ive packages have been upgraded and 
reorganised to place greater emphasis on longer term assistance and 
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the payment of short term incent ives in cash rather than tax 
concessions to bridge cash f low problems. Fourth, attempts are to be 
made to mob i l i s e funds from the pr i va te f inanc ia l sector f o r the 
continued development of growth points. To th i s end, the Southern 
African Development Bank was established in September 1983. Finally, 
d i rect controls on the growth of metropolitan areas are to be replaced 
by i nd i r e c t f i s c a l d i s incen t i v es . The i n s t i tu t i ona l and f inanc ia l 
systems underpinning the programme have also been reorganised.1^ 
Several types of growth points are now dist inguished (see Table 1); 
(a) ' i n d u s t r i a l deve lopment p o i n t s ' ( IDP 's ) - " p o i n t s where 
a l t e r n a t i v e a g g l o m e r a t i o n advantages could be c r ea t ed to 
counterbalance the existing metropoles"; (b) 'deconcentration points ' 
- "points adjacent or close to the metropolitan areas towards whicl 
industrial growth could be deconcentrated to lessen the pressure of 
overconcentrat ion in the metropol i tan areas"; (c) 'other development 
points' - "points with less potential to develop as counterbalances to 
the existing metropoles and/or where the development needs of the sub-
region are not as g rea t as in other areas"; and (d) 'ad hoc cases' -
where cer ta in industr ies may be granted incent ives on mer i t at 
l oca t i ons other than estab l ished growth points.16 The incent ives 
vary across reg ions, between d i f f e r e n t types of growth po int , and 
between 'whi te ' areas and the bantustans, and some idea of the 
variation can be gauged from Table 2. In addition, i t can be seen why 
the incent ives obtaining at p laces l i k e Dimbaza in Ciskei have been 
described as "poss ib ly the wor ld 's best indust r ia l concessions" .1 7 
For instance, since cash grants per labourer often exceed wages, i t is 
possible for an employer (at least under Transkeian regulations) to 
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make a p ro f i t without producing anything or while trading.at a loss.18 
Furthermore, i t i s c lear that wh i l s t incent ives are genera l l y more 
a t t r a c t i v e in the bantustans, the d i f f e r e n t i a l s are not always 
s i g n i f i c a n t . As we w i l l argue l a t e r , these d i f f e r e n t i a l s c lose 
apprec iably i f the pos i t i ona l , i n f r as t ruc tu ra l and agglomeration 
advantages of growth points establ ished in 'whi te ' areas are taken 
into consideration. 
Reactions to the new programme have been very p o s i t i v e in ce r ta in 
quartersl9 and, whilst i t i s too early to speculate with confidence on 
the long-term prospects for the pol icy, i t would appear that the new 
in i t i a t i v es have stimulated much greater interest among industrial ists 
than hitherto (see Figure 1). For instance, a survey of manufacturing 
companies (albeit s l i ght ly biased towards larger firms) in the major 
metropol i tan centres demonstrates a not inconsiderable l e v e l of 
i n t e r e s t in decentra l i sed expansion or r e l o ca t i on (although not 
necessarily to the bantustans), part icularly in PWV and Durban (Table 
3). The same survey also indicates that anticipated employment growth 
rates for existing firms appear to be s igni f i cant ly higher in at least 
two bantustan growth points ( I s i thebe and Butterworth; average 
approximately 6,0 percent per annum) than those given by a comparable 
sample of metropolitan industries (average approximately 3,0 percent; 
see Table 4). Signi f icant ly, too, the involvement of foreign capital 
also seems to be increasing; for the period 1982/84, foreign investors 
accounted f o r 5,8 pe r c en t o f ' approved ' a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
decen t ra l i sa t i on and 18,4 percent of the jobs.20 I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a 
large share of this investment is directed towards the bantustans in 
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sharp contrast to the ear l ier hesitancy of multinationals to establish 
operat ions in these a r eas . 2 1 Of par t i cu lar in te res t here is the 
dominance of Taiwanese companies which contributed 52 percent of the 
jobs arising from foreign investment.22 
Not surprisingly, then, given the dismal record of decentralisation up 
to now, the o f f i c i a l reaction to these results is one of optimism.23 
I nev i t ab l y , too, th is has generated a number of premature and 
extravagant c laims in terms of the impact and v i a b i l i t y of the 
pol icy.24 However, i t should be stressed that only about 40 - 50 
percent of these 'approved' jobs w i l l actually material ise (see Figure 
2); f o r example, only 41 percent of decentra l i sed jobs that were 
'approved' in the calendar year 1981 had been establ ished by the end 
of the 'grace per iod ' in 1983. 2 5 More important ly , though, Table 5 
indicates that, i f consideration is given to variations in 'drop-out' 
ra tes ( be l i eved to be higher in the bantustans ) , more jobs are 
l i k e l y to be establ ished in 'white ' areas than the bantustans from 
projects 'approved' between 1982 and 1984. Moreover, the jobs w i l l be 
heav i l y concentrated at a small number of growth points (see Figure 
3). For example, Isithebe - located on the edge of KwaZulu only 100km 
from Durban and 80km from the major port at Richards Bay - accounted 
f o r 31 percent of a l l app l i ca t ions and 46 percent of the jobs in 
1982/84 d i rec ted towards growth points in the non-' independent' 
bantustans.26 One of the most successful of the bantustan IDP's, 12 
350 people are now employed in I s i thebe and the number of 
manufacturing plants established there las risen from 1 in 1971 to 86 
in March 1984. 27 S im i l a r l y , Babelegi in Bophuthatswana - s i tuated 
very close to the PWV industrial complex - is the most successful of 
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the growth points in the 'independent' bantustans with 14_ 500 workers 
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currently employed. Equally, East London and Ladysmith accounted 
for 18 percent and 8 percent of the jobs in border and middle hierachy 
growth points,29 while Pietermaritzburg arri Atlantis each accounted 
for 29 percent of jobs in 'white' deconcentration points.30. 
The concentration of decentralised ac t i v i ty in those centres which are 
most advantaged economically has been a feature of the programme from 
the beginning. But what is d i f f e r en t about the current situation is 
that, although few of these centres are in the bantustans ( for reasons 
discussed in section three), the 1982 programme would appear to favour 
a process of concentrat ion. What th is might imply i s a s i g n i f i c a n t 
relaxation of the po l i t i ca l objectives of the programme, heralding a 
poss ib l e s h i f t away from the obsession with indus t r i a l i s ing the 
bantustans at any cost and a corresponding move towards a sense of 
economic r a t i o n a l i t y . These o b j e c t i v e s and th is ' s h i f t ' are the 
subjects of the following section. 
2. POLITICAL AND EXXMWIC IMPERATIVES FOR DECENTRALISATION 
Whereas the government has continued to insist that "... the economic 
31 benef i ts of decentralisation are tremendous", most c r i t i c s of the 
po l i c y have regarded i t as " . . . en t i r e l y p o l i t i c a l , economical ly 
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irrat ional and in contradiction to economic trends". Those of the 
l a t t e r persuasion might we l l f ind conf i rmat ion of the i r analys is 
in ter a l i a in that; (a) the dec la ra t i on of growth points - most of 
which have been located where pos i t i ona l , in f ras t ruc tura l and 
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agglomeration advantages are negl ig ib le - has been determined by the 
need to a l l o ca t e severa l to each of the bantustans and a need to 
sa t i s fy the demands of inf luential white constituencies anxious to 
achieve growth point status; (b) the net level of employment generated 
as a d i r e c t r esu l t of the programme is negat ive in balance; (c) the 
state must bear the burden of underwritirq infrastructural development 
and paying incent ives whi le e f f e c t i v e l y reducing i t s taxat ion base 
(both corporate and personal) by r e s t r i c t i n g economic growth in the 
metropol i tan areas; (d) notwithstanding poss ib le advantages to 
i n d i v i d u a l companies , the r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e o p p o s i t i o n to 
decen t ra l i sa t i on among i n d u s t r i a l i s t s whose in t e r es t s are badly 
af fected by restr ict ions on metropolitan growth and the high level of 
taxat ion required to help f inance the po l i cy and other f ace ts of 
apartheid administrat ion. C l ea r l y , on balance, the return on 
investment in decentralisation is not 'posit ive ' , being substantially 
lower than would have accrued i f the cap i ta l had been applied in 
another direction and/or location. 
Thus decen t ra l i sa t i on is seen to be serving a v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l 
objectives, the most important of which seem to be: 
(a) a means f o r increasing the number of job opportuni t ies in the 
bantustans so as to retain a greater proportion of blacks within 
these areas whi le simultaneously ensuring that migrat ion is 
geared more e f f i c i e n t l y to the demands of the urban labour 
markets. As Legassick (1974, pp.13-15) noted, the dilemma for 
the South A f r i can s ta te has always been how to engender the 
development of industry without "... simultaneously encouraging a 
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r ise in the permanent black urban population". Decentralisation 
was thought to be at l eas t part of the so lut ion. Z i l l e (1983, 
p.65), for example, contends that decentralisation is "... aimed 
at providing the economic base fo r the populat ion d i s t r i bu t i on 
needed to re ta in e thn i c i t y as the fundamental organising 
principle of society". The object ive, though, was not to develop 
the bantustans as competitive sub-economies capable of sat isfying 
the j ob demands of a l l the i r ' c i t i z e n s ' but to ensure that the 
p o o l s of cheap mig ran t labour r e s e r v ed in these areas 
corresponded e f f i c i e n t l y to the precise demands of metropolitan 
employers. As Harsch (1980, pp.75-76) observed, "... anything 
more than a very l im i t ed l e v e l of i ndus t r i a l i sa t i on in the 
bantustans could, by providing alternative sources of employment 
for Africans, undermine the migratory labour system that much of 
the South African economy is based on". 
an attempt to defuse popular protest and labour organisation in 
the urban areas by furthering the potential of the bantustans to 
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accommodate a l a r g e r e s i d e n t p o p u l a t i o n . The V i l j o e n 
Commission (1958), for example, advocated decentralisation on the 
grounds that further urbanisation of the African population would 
increase the l i ke l ihood of ' p o l i t i c a l subversion'. Conversely, 
the opt ion of decen t ra l i sa t i on could be used by employers to 
threaten recalcitrant workers. Moreover, by relocating sections 
of low wage industry to the bantustans, decentralisation would 
strengthen the material base of their 'governments' and thereby 
help to de f l ec t po l i t i ca l and trade union grievances away from 
13 
the South African state towards the bantustan authorities. 
(c) a means of fostering class formation in the bantustans. As rioted 
above, white industrial ists were prohibited from the bantustans 
prior to 1968, part ia l ly in order to protect local capi ta l is ts , 
but the policy now appears to be aimed at developing bureaucratic 
and technocratic class fractions complementary to the interests 
34 of 'white ' capital . 
(d) an attempt to leg i t imise the bantustan policy in both local and 
international forums and to ensure the compliance of bantustan 
leaders with the promise of economic development. Thus, f o r 
Hirsch (1983, p.153), "... the evidence suggests that whi le the 
state desired some development of the bantustan economies, the 
elimination of unemployment and (the) creation of viable economic 
structures were not the policy pr ior i t i es . Hie highest pr ior i ty 
was, in fact, the immediate strengthening of emerging po l i t i ca l 
structures in the bantustans". This is evident, he suggests, in 
the way that capital- intensive projects have been encouraged and 
the number of growth points consistently extended to "maximise 
v i s i b i l i t y " 3 5 
Thus, from this perspective decentralisation may be understood as an 
attempt to ar res t the impending co l l apse of the bantustan sub-
economies - thereby s t a b i l i s i n g the migrant labour system - by 
securing condit ions su i tab le f o r industr ia l investment in these 
areas. Further, by propelling decentralisation towards a stage of 
'self-sustaining' growth, the state may have hoped to sh i f t at least 
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part of the burden of 'deve loping ' the bantustans or)to p r i va te 
c ap i t a l . I t i s held , then, that the f a i l u r e of th i s s t rategy i s 
primarily the result of the fact that capital 's f i r s t loya l t i es are to 
p r o f i t and accumulation, and i t s response to decen t ra l i sa t i on i s 
the r e f o r e premised upon economic rather than p o l i t i c a l f ac to rs . 
According to Glaser (1983, p.8), therefore, the government has so far 
f a i l e d to overcome an " i n v e s tmen t b o y c o t t " on the pa r t o f 
industr ial ists. 
On the other hand, i t might also be argued that decentralisation may 
be underpinned or reinforced by certain economic imperatives. Lacey 
(1982, p.48), for example, contends that "... decentralisation must be 
seen as a part of the process of reorganisat ion of industr ia l 
production which has been brought about by changed condit ions fo r 
capital in South Africa". This arises from the fact that although the 
South African manufacturing sector has grown very rapidly since the 
last War, i t i s "... simply not competitive in international markets" 
^ and remains subordinate to and dependent on the state for subsidies 
and other forms of support. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the manufacturing sector 
has manifested a high propensity to import together with a low 
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propensity to export , and the in f low of f o r e i gn cap i ta l has been 
essen t i a l to i t s continued growth. Even during the boom of the 
1960's, i t was s t i l l evident that South A f r i can i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were 
"... ne i ther able to break s u f f i c i e n t l y into export markets, nor 39 
generate l oca l production of c ap i t a l goods". And, at present, "... 
there are no signs whatever that South A f r i c a is achieving a break-
through into exporting more sophisticated manufactured goods, and i f 
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anything South African manufacturing has been becoming more vulnerable 
to foreign competition in the home market".40 
I t is argued, then, that the resolution of this c r i s i s - particularly 
under condi t ions of dec l in ing f o re i gn investment and f a l l i n g gold 
revenues - w i l l depend upon a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement in the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, especial ly in view of the 
constraints on domestic market expansion imposed by a highly skewed 
income d i s t r i bu t i on . As Legassick and Innes (1977, p.459) note: ".. 
the poss ib i l i t i es for continued accumulation are crucial ly dependent 
on South Africa's ab i l i t y to extend i t s export earnings". One way in 
which th i s might be rea l i sed is through the re loca t i on of cap i t a l -
notably, labour-intensive or highly deskilled forms of production -
to non-metropolitan areas where labour costs are lower. Clearly, 
export-oriented industries would benefit through lower cost structures 
p a r t i c u l a r l y at a time when domestic i n f l a t i o n (despite a serious 
dec l ine in the value of the Rand) may be eroding the i r a b i l i t y to 
penetrate foreign markets. Similarly, import-substituting industries 
would improve their standing against their international competitors 
provided that decentralisation diseconomies do not counterbalance the 
advantages of r e loca t ion . I t i s in th i s context that Be l l (1983; 
1984) has argued that a s u b s t a n t i a l proport ion of indust r ia l 
r e l o c a t i o n s to d e c e n t r a l i s e d areas from the mid 1970's were 
'spontaneous' in the sense that they would have occurred in the 
absence of incent ives. He suggests, then, that South A f r i can 
capitalism is undergoing a reorganisation towards a regional divis ion 
of labour - a local manifestation of the restructuring of capital at 
the international level - and that a r t i f i c i a l mechanisms designed to 
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encourage decen t ra l i sa t i on w i l l become unnecessary as .the process 
moves beyond i t s present embryonic phase. Associated with this is the 
view that several of the a l l e g ed l y ' p o l i t i c a l ' imperat ives of the 
po l i c y may no longer be e n t i r e l y contrad ic tory to the in t e res t of 
c a p i t a l . For i n s t ance , the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f i n c e n t i v e s and 
in f ras t ruc ture in low-wage un-unionised areas may serve we l l the 
in t e r es t s of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s fac ing a concerted chal lenge from 
emergent unions in the metropolitan centres. 
Obviously, severa l counter-arguments may be raised against th i s 
thes is . In the f i r s t p lace , the recent burgeoning of i n t e r es t in 
decen t ra l i sa t i on among i ndus t r i a l i s t s cannot be cited as conclusive 
evidence of strong economic pressures in favour of i t . The empirical 
evidence presently suggests that i t is "... state intervention in the 
form of incentives which seems to have played the most important role 
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in promoting decent ra l i sa t i on " . Secondly, wh i l s t there is some 
evidence of a sec tora l b ias towards more labour- in tens ive forms of 
production in decentralised areas (see section four), they do not seem 
to be s igni f icant ly more export-oriented. Similarly, i t remains to be 
demonstrated convincingly that there is a disproportionate number of 
industr ies being a f f e c t e d by ' excess ive ' compet i t ion from imports 
among those that are decentralising at the moment, although there may 
be some indications that this is the case in t ex t i l es and c lothing/3 
In the absence of consistent supporting data, B e l l ' s thes is remains 
speculative. What is interesting, though, is that the proportion of 
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manufacturing employment located in decentralised areas has shown a 
steady and not insubstantial increase since the 1970's ( r i s ing from 
12,3 percent in 1972 and 12,9 percent in 1978 to 19,3 percent in 1984; 
see Figure 4). Cer ta in l y , the prov is ion of incent ives at growth 
points has been centra l to th is process but one might a l so argue 
(considering that by 1981 only 35 percent o f jobs in decentra l i sed 
areas had been established under the auspices of the Decentralisation 
Board; comparing data in Figures 1 and 4) that , jus t as Rogerson 
(1975a; 1975b) noted a move towards the 'suburbanisation' of industry 
in the 1960's, so an imperative towards decentralisation may exist in 
the present. What we would suggest, though, i s that i f there is a 
' spontaneous ' e l ement to d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , then i t w i l l a c t 
increas ing ly to focus indust r ia l re locat ion on a r e l a t i v e l y small 
number of advantaged growth points. Thus, i f the findings of section 
three are co r r e c t , 'spontaneous' decen t ra l i sa t i on w i l l be d i rec ted 
l a r g e l y towards the metropol i tan per ipher ies or establ ished towns 
rather than IDP's located deep within the bantustans. Clearly, this 
would work against the o b j e c t i v e of bantustan 'development', ye t a 
c lose reading of the 1982 programme would imply that there is a 
certain leve l of state support for i t . 
Whereas the 1982 package is in many ways a t yp i ca l product of a 
compromise between the conf l ic t ing interests of apartheid ideology arri 
manufactur ing i ndus t r y , i t a l s o bears ev idence of a growing 
sens i t iv i ty to the needs of capital. While the increase in the number 
of declared growth points and the a l l o ca t i on of advantages to those 
situated in the bantustans suggests a continuation of attempts to link 
decentralisation to the ideology of separate development, the creation 
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of funct iona l reg ions, the intent ion to concentrate resources on 
par t i cu la r growth po ints , the attempts to persuade the business 
community to underwrite the programme, and the attract ive incentives 
assigned to 'white' deconcentration and development points r e f l e c t a 
hitherto unprecedented level of pragmatism and possibly recognition of 
a drive towards the relocation of capital in areas where labour costs 
are lower but where l o ca t i ona l , agglomeration and in f ras t ruc tura l 
economies are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f e r i o r to those obtaining in the 
metropolitan centres. 
3. LIMITATIONS TO GROWTH POINT DEVEDOEMQJr IN THE BANTUSTANS 
(1) Fiscal Constraints 
A major constra int on the development of growth points in the 
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bantustans i s i t s " e x t r ao rd ina r i l y expensive" cost to the South 
African state. One estimate is that each decentralised job represents 
a total investment (direct arri infrastructural) of between R60,000 -
R100,000 per job, approximately four t imes i t s metropol i tan 
45 equivalent. Obviously, recurrent investments in infrastructure w i l l 
d iminish gradual ly in the larger centres but there seems l i t t l e 
reason to expect th i s d i spa r i t y to c lose s i g n i f i c a n t l y in the short 
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term. Thus, in almost a l l the bantustan growth points (an 
important exception being Babelegi ) investments by the Development 
Corporations cons i s t en t l y exceed the contr ibut ions of pr i va te 
cap i ta l . 4 7 
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Furthermore, whilst the argument is advanced that the growth points 
w i l l eventual ly outgrow the i r dependence on incent ives , there i s 
l i t t l e l i k e l ihood that th is w i l l be poss ib le in the fo reseeab le 
f u t u r e . Survey data f o r the I s i t h e b e (KwaZulu), Umtata and 
Butterworth (Transkei) IDP's (Table 6) and f o r manufacturing 
companies in the metropol i tan centres (Table 7)^® show that the 
prov is ion of incent ives i s the most important f ac to r inf luencing 
industrial ists ' decisions to invest at growth points (wage subsidies 
being considered the most important; see Table 13). I n t e r e s t i ng l y , 
the metropolitan data i l lustrate how the signif icance of incentives as 
a location factor increases with their value (from urban areas through 
deconcentration points to IDP's). Associated with th i s i s a 
tendency f o r inter-urban re loca t i ons to be determined s o l e l y by 
' tradit ional ' economic considerat ions. 
Similar results were obtained by Tomlinson et al (1984a^; see Table 
6 ) , in whose survey 79 percent of the respondents said that the i r 
present growth point l oca t i on would not have been considered in the 
absence of incent ives , and 49 percent said that incent ives were 
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necessary to operate at a p r o f i t . Broadly comparable f i gures are 
c i t ed by Dewar e t a l (1984)52 a n d Green and Hirsch (1982a, p.43).53 
In the former survey, while 62 percent of industrial ists claimed that 
they could continue business without incentives, only 49 percent said 
that they would continue. On the other hand, because most of the 
lat ter companies were re la t i ve ly small they go on to suggest that only 
19 percent of jobs in centres included in their survey would be lost 
i f incent ives were withdrawn and a further 8 percent would be in 
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doubt. However, whilst the termination of incentives may not result 
in an immediate and wholesale exodus of investment -" because of 
certain inert ia l factors - i t w i l l obviously have a very considerable 
impact upon the in f l ow of new investment from the metropol i tan 
centres . Taken together , then, these observat ions provide l i t t l e 
support for Bel l 's ideas of 'spontaneous' decentralisation. I t should 
be s t ressed, though, that the prospects f o r decen t ra l i sa t i on in the 
absence of incent ives are not as easy to evaluate as the a foregoing 
discussion might suggest. 
Also important to considerat ions of publ ic expenditure is the f a c t 
that wh i l e most incent ives are intended to a s s i s t companies fo r a 
period of 7 to 10 years , in p rac t i c e the ma j o r i t y of companies have 
managed to secure incentives for longer periods. Dewar et al (1984, 
p.63), f o r instance, note that 40 perent of the companies in the i r 
survey that were establ ished be fo re 1960 were s t i l l r ece iv ing 
incent i ves in 1983 and a further 20 percent expected to r ece i ve 
incentives in the future. Thus: 
"a t the present t ime, i t appears un l ike ly that incent ives 
w i l l be phased out, even though this intention is frequently 
expressed by government o f f i c i a l s . I t appears to be 
r e l a t i v e l y easy f o r industr ies to extend concessions by 
replac ing machinery or expanding premises and applying for 
incent i ves de novo on these improvements; many companies 
opting for the 1982 incentive package w i l l be able to extend 
the i r period of subsidised operat ions ye t again, and i t i s 
l i k e l y that long establ ished industr ies w i l l continue to 
r e ce i v e incent ives so as to pro tec t them from compet i t ion 
from new, heavily subsidised industry"55 
Indeed, in our surveys in Butterworth, respondents f requent ly 
complained that the 1982 package had g iven an 'un fa i r ' advantage to 
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new compet i tors in the Ciskei and that some 'adjustments' to the i r 
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contracts should be made as compensation. Cer ta in l y , g iven the 
s ta t e ' s need to encourage the few i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who have taken 
advantage of incent ives at bantustan growth points to continue 
operat ions f o r 'demonstration' purposes, investors c l e a r l y have 
considerable opportuni t ies f o r r e -nego t ia t ing contracts on the i r 
terms. In addition, the new emphasis on long-term incentives in the 
1982 package seems to suggest o f f i c i a l recogn i t ion of the cos t -
i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of bantustan centres and a commitment to permanent 
subsidisation.57 
The s ta te ' s burden is a lso cer ta in to be increased by 'concession-
hopping' - companies migrating from one growth centre to another in 
order to re ta in a f u l l package of incent ives - although th i s i s 
58 
s t r i c t l y i l l e ga l , and by corruption (claims f o r 'ghost' employees, 
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non-ex istent machinery and tra in ing schemes e tc . ) . Furthermore, 
whi le the impact of incent ives i s probably ".. not so much to 
encourage i n e f f i c i e n t i n d u s t r i e s but i n e f f i c i e n t l oca t i on " , ^^ 
decentra l i sed areas w i l l a t t r a c t the i r share of 'lame ducks' -
uncompetitive businesses which use incentives to continue trading or 
to make quick p r o f i t s - pa r t i cu l a r l y in the bantustans where the 61 
bureaucracies are not so e f f i c i en t . Stanwix (1984, pp.230-231), for 
instance, argues that severa l companies that he interv iewed in 
Isithebe had relocated primarily as a result of their fa i lure to raise 
capital for technological improvements and thus remain compet i t i ve 
while paying metropolitan wages. 
22 
In short, given the dependence of bantustan industries on incentives, 
the s t a t e ' s a b i l i t y to a c c e l e r a t e i t s s u b s i d i s a t i o n o f 
decentralisation must be questioned. In addition to i t s investment in 
infrastructure, the state is faced with a sizeable and rapidly growing 
b i l l f o r incent ives (see Figure 5). Simultaneously, the f inanc ia l 
burden of propping up the bantustans is becoming increasingly onerous 
fo r the South A f r ican s ta te . Although the disbursements from 
Pretoria have terded to outstrip inf lat ion and appear to have assumed 
some pr ior i ty during the present recession, their impact on bantustan 
development has been i n s i g n i f i c a n t (Thomas, 1981) whi le a s i z eab l e 
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proportion has been wasted on bloated bureaucracies and siphoned o f f 
63 by corrupt public servants. As a result, amidst talk of a 'revenue 
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cr i s i s ' among government o f f i c i a l s , the government intends to trim 
i t s spending on bantustan 'development' and poss ib ly t i e expenditure 
to approved projects.^5 Moreover, at the same time that the state is 
being confronted by a rap id ly esca la t ing b i l l f o r incent ives and 
in f ras t ruc tura l development in decentralised areas, the Environment 
Planning Act - by r e s t r i c t i n g economic growth in the metropol i tan 
centres - nega t i ve l y a f f e c t s the s ta te purse v ia i t s impact on 
c o r p o r a t e ea rn ings and hence c o r p o r a t e tax. For i ns tance , 
notwithstanding denia ls by government spokesmen,^ there is growing 
concern among observers that the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area is "... 
be ing c r i p p l e d by the Government's decen t ra l i sa t i on po l i c y " 
( s p e c i f i c a l l y , by d i v e r t ing po ten t ia l investors to decentra l i sed 
areas) and industrial spokesmen have continually warned against the 
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dangers of r e s t r i c t i n g industr ia l growth in the c i t i e s . i t i s 
poss ib l e , then, that the new f i s c a l d i s incen t i v e s present ly being 
23 
considered by the government as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the Environment 
Planning Act may imply a relaxation of state control over metropolitan 
expansion. But whilst this w i l l ease the state's 'revenue c r i s i s ' i t 
w i l l a lso be p r e jud i c i a l to the decen t ra l i sa t i on programme. Thus, 
unless incent ives are to be gradual ly phased out, or f inanced by 
increased corporate taxat ion, or (more l i k e l y ) concentrated at a 
smaller number of growth points , i t i s ce r ta in that the s ta te w i l l 
become increas ing ly dependent on the p r i va t e f i nanc i a l sector to 
underwrite decentralisation.69 I t is , however, too early to evaluate 
the state's early in i t i a t i ves in this direction. 
(2) Labour 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of e s p e c i a l l y cheap and p l e n t i f u l labour in the 
bantustans i s obviously a major s t imu lus to d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
(consistently ranked second behind incentives; see Tables 6 and 7), a 
factor stressed by a variety of studies.70 Although re l iab le data are 
d i f f i c u l t to obtain and questionnaire responses must be treated with 
caution, the wage d i s p a r i t i e s between the bantustans and the 
metropolitan centres are c lear ly of considerable dimensions.71- Part 
of the reason for this is that black sk i l l l eve ls are generally higher 
in the metropol i tan centres. For instance, Dewar e t a l (1984, p.77) 
found that on average 74 percent o f jobs in the i r survey of growth 
points were c lass i f i ed as unskilled; this rising to 87 percent in the 
bantustan sub-sample (also see our Table 12). However, a comparison 
of wage l e v e l s within indiv idual s k i l l ca tegor i es s t i l l revea ls 
start l ing dispar i t ies particularly at the lower end of the spectrum. 
In Dewar et a l 's (1984, p.81) survey, for example, wages for unskilled 
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males in the bantustans averaged out at R107 per month compared to 
R285 per month in the metropol i tan areas. Equivalent f i gures f o r 
females were R94 per month and R279 per month. Other figures suggest 
that industrial labourers in Transkei and machinists in Isithebe are 
paid at 43 percent 7 2 and 45 percent 7 3 r e spe c t i v e l y of average rates 
obtaining in the c i t i e s . In addi t ion , the working week is usually 
longer in the bantustans and archaic labour l e g i s l a t i o n a l lows 
employers to avoid metropol i tan health and sa f e t y norms as we l l as 
sick leave and compensation regulations.74 
These wage desparities are essential ly products of d i f ferences in the 
supply of labour. As a r esu l t of in f lux contro l and the forced 
removal of black communities f r om 'wh i t e ' South A f r i ca to the i r 
r e s p e c t i v e 'homelands ' , the bantustans a r e areas o f mass i ve 
unemployment so there i s v i r t u a l l y no compet i t ion among the few 
employers to bid up the pr i ce of labour. Muller (1984, pp.2 and 7) , 
for example, has shown that whilst 12 270 Transkeians were employed in 
manufacturing at the end of 1983 the labour supply (excluding 
migrants) stood at 597 000. Comparable f igures for Ciskei are 19 770 
and 400 000.75 An addi t iona l f ac to r i s the over - representat ion of 
female labour in bantustan industries.7® The reason for th i s is 
that under the present system of in f lux con t ro l , women have fewer 
oppor tuni t i es to migrate to the c i t i e s than men. As a r esu l t , 
employers regard women as more ' r e l i a b l e ' than men as we l l as being 
cheaper to employ. Their p roduc t i v i t y i s a lso considered to be 
somewhat higher.77 Being e f f e c t i v e l y trapped in the bantustans, then, 
women are e a s i l y exp lo i ted . Green and Hirsch (1982a, p.44), for 
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example, c i t e wages in the Ciskei as low as R40 - R60 per month f o r 
women and R80 to R112 per month for men. 
A f i n a l f a c to r - and one that i s becoming increas ing ly important in 
widening wage d i s p a r i t i e s - ar ises from the concentrat ion of trade 
union act ion in the metropol i tan centres. Although the independent 
black trade unions have made s i g n i f i c a n t advances in the past few 
years, s t r i k e act ion has- been heav i l y focused upon the major 
industrial completes and in cer ta in indust ies , notably t e x t i l e s and 
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motor assembly. '0 And, whi le severa l unions have attempted to 
mobilise workers within the bantustans, they have been frustrated by 
highly conservative managements, unsympathetic local authorities and 
particularly repressive labour r e l a t i ons l e g i s l a t i o n . As Whiteside 
(1984) and Haysom and Khoza (1984) demonstrate, trade unions have 
v i r t u a l l y no means of operating l e g a l l y in any of the bantustans. 
Transkei and Venda, f o r example, have passed their own Industr ia l 
Conc i l i a t i on Acts which - in i ron ic contrast to the South A f r i can 
e q u i v a l e n t - make flo p r o v i s on f o r t r ade unions or employer 
organisations. Bophuthatswana, on the other harri, provides for trade 
unions but requires them to be r eg i s t e red and headquartered in the 
terr i tory . 7 9 In some cases, minimum wage rates have been introduced 
to substitute for co l l ec t i ve bargaining.80 
t. 
In addi t ion , d i r e c t s ta te repression has been employed in many 
instances to curb union a c t i v i t i e s . The banning of SAAWU (South 
A f r i can A l l i e d Workers Union) in the Ciskei i s one example of th i s . 
Led by a p a r t i c u l a r l y energe t i c and m i l i t a n t execut ive , SAAWU has 
become a major fores in the East London area over the past few years. 
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I n i t i a l l y , i t had considerable success in improving wage.rates in the 
city®''- but the Ciskeian author i t ies were c l e a r l y anxious to prevent 
SAAWU from organising wi thin the Ciske i - where i t had strong 
representat ion in East London's dormitory township Mdantsane - and 
interfering with the development of i t s IDP's. As a result, the SAAWU 
execut ive was subjected to var ious forms of in t imidat ion and 
harassment leading eventual ly to i t s banning from the t e r r i t o r y in 
1983.82 
But desp i te these obvious advantages to employers, labour is 
considered a major 'problem' f o r bantustan industr ies - ranked the 
most ser ious disadvantage by companies in both the metropol i tan 
centres ard the bantustan growth points (Table 8). The scarcity (and 
hence high cost ) of s k i l l e d labour, and the low produc t i v i t y of 
unskilled labour are the most frequent complaints. This is confirmed 
by other surveys; p roduc t i v i t y was considered 'unsatisfactory' by 49 
percent of bantustan industr ies in one study and 52 percent in 
another.®3 Industrial ists also complain about absenteeism, poor time-
keeping, an underdeveloped sense of ' i ndus t r i a l d i s c i p l i n e ' and high 
turnover l e v e l s . ® 4 Moreove r , wh i l e t ra in ing programmes are 
frequently subsidised by the state at growth points,8 5 employers claim 
that workers tend to use these as 'stepping stones' to the urban 
labour markets.8® Interest ingly , the r e f o r e , when asked to weigh up 
the net e f f e c t of wage rates , wage subsid ies , p roduc t i v i t y and 
training costs, a surprisingly high proport ion of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s in 
our surveys considered labour costs (including managerial/professional 
categories) in decentralised areas to be equal or even higher than 
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metropol i tan l e v e l s . The re levant f i gures were 48 percent f o r the 
metropol i tan sample ( r e f e r r i ng to growth points in general ) and 36 
percent for industries in Isithebe and Butterworth (Table 9). 
I t i s also clear that decentralisation w i l l be seriously af fected by 
any s igni f icant closing of wage disparit ies. Hie prospects for this 
are d i f f i c u l t to assess. Doubtless, the independent unions w i l l 
become more act ive in the bantustans and attempt to forge recognition 
agreements and to bargain with individual employers independently of 
the l eg i s l a t i v e framework. In August 1983, for example, although Wage 
Determinations secured in the metropolitan centres have been held not 
to apply in border and bantustan areas, MAWU (Metal and Al l ied Workers 
Union) managed to reach an agreement over wage increases with the 
t r a i l e r manufacturer Henred Freuhauf covering a l l of i t s f a c t o r i e s 
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including the one at I s i thebe . And, notwithstanding attempts by 
employers to isolate and harass union act iv is ts , MAWU is going ahead 
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with i t s plans to secure similar agreements with other firms. On 
the other hand, whereas some argue that "... cheap labour only remains 
cheap un t i l someone in the ranks gets a b i t of savvy and the Utopian oq 
bubble bursts" , there seems l i t t l e l i ke l ihood that the more 
v i c i o u s l y repress ive bantustan regimes such as those in Ciskei and 
Transkei w i l l relax their contro l over trade union a c t i v i t i e s . 
Moreover, i t i s extremely unl ike ly that trade unions w i l l be 
successful in raising bantustan wages to metropolitan leve ls given a 
continuation of the system that concentrates surplus labour in the 
impoverished reserves. 
Such speculat ion is further confused by possible ambiguities in the 
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react ion of employers and po t en t i a l inves tors to the emergence of 
trade union representation in the bantustans. Several respondents in 
our surveys ac tua l l y f e l t that trade union representat ion would 
' s t a b i l i s e ' the labour f o r c e by g i v i n g workers a means f o r 
articulating grievances other than absentseeism, low productivity and 
industrial sabotage, and by giving management a means of consulting 
employees. Furthermore, wh i l s t the impetus to ' c ap i t a l f l i g h t ' is 
c l e a r l y an important one, there are no c lear ind icat ions that 
decentralising industries are those being hardest h i t by labour action 
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in the industr ia l centres. One fur ther point i s that low 
p roduc t i v i t y in the bantustans may act to d i v e r t investment to 
'white' growth points, particularly those where the labour pools are 
more accustomed to industr ia l employment. Although trade union 
a c t i v i t y i s ce r ta in to be more of a fac tor in such centres , wage 
l e v e l s - whi le higher than those obtaining in the bantustans - are 
91 s igni f icant ly lower than their metropolitan equivalents. 
(3) Infrastructure 
Table 8 shows that the re la t ive ly underdeveloped state of growth point 
infrastructure is also considered a major disadvantage by investors. 
A comparison of the two sets of survey data a lso suggests that th is 
problem is more serious in bantustan growth points. Similar results 
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have emerged from other surveys. Whilst ine f f i c i en t u t i l i t i e s were 
the subject of many complaints, the most serious d i f f i c u l t y appeared 
to be communications (telephone,telex and postal services) which were 
generally regarded as extremely unreliable. On the other hand, growth 
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points in established centres such as East London and Pietermaritzburg 
experience few problems in this direction. 
(4) Distance from Suppliers and Markets 
Table 10 indicates that, for the companies involved in our survey; (a) 
the proport ion of inputs - materials/supplies, plant and services -
der ived l o c a l l y i s exceedingly smal l ; and (b) the l o ca l market i s 
r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Hence, the ma jo r i t y of decentra l i sed 
companies are confronted with a s i g n i f i c a n t increase in transport 
costs. As a result, distance from suppliers and markets is considered 
a major disadvantage of a peripheral location (Table 8). Besides the 
• increase in transport costs, industrial ists are also concerned about 
transhipment delays to and from suppliers and customers. Given the 
ine f f ic iency of transport services within the bantustans (and certain 
administrative delays related to Custom's Union regulations in those 
that are 'independent'), delays between despatch and del ivery tend to 
be more an exponential than linear function of distance. Comparable 
resu l ts have been obtained in other surveys of bantustan growth 
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points. Obviously, though, problems of this nature are less severe 
in growth points on or close to the metropolitan peripheries. 
(4) Managerial Problems 
In sp i t e of the propaganda issued by the Development Corporations 
emphasising the more attract ive f ace ts of the soc ia l in f ras t ructure 
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obtaining at bantustan growth points, most decentralised companies 
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exper ience d i f f i c u l t i e s in a t t rac t ing skilled/managerial s ta f f even 
where the costs of r e loca t ing and housing 'key personnel ' are 
subsidised (see Table 8). Housing shortages and inadequate service, 
shopping and enter ta inment f a c i l i t i e s are the most f r e q u e n t 
complaints. Hence, Dewar et al (1984, pp.60-61) note that 70 percent 
of respondents in the i r bantustan sample considered the soc ia l 
in f ras t ruc ture 'unsa t i s f ac to ry ' . A further 'problem' appears to be 
a genera l l y negat ive percep t i on of pe rsona l s e c u r i t y and the 
re luctance of white South A f r i cans to l i v e in c lose proximity to 
b l acks and have t h e i r l i v e s even p a r t l y c o n t r o l l e d by b lack 
'governments'. This resu l ts in s i tua t ions where white managers 
commute to their jobs from 'white' areas - East London to Butterworth 
for example - and where both black and white fami l ies l iv ing in the 
bantustans commute to neighbouring 'white' centres to take advantage 
of their superior f a c i l i t e s . Again, this tends to favour the growth 
points in established centres. 
(6) Bureaucratic Problems 
Several respondents in our surveys reported d i f f i c u l t i e s in dealing 
with government and various fractions of the bureaucracy. The major 
complaint appeared to be incompetence, ine f f ic iency and delay in the 
handling of business a f f a i r s by the Development Corporations. In 
add i t i on , a number of informants expressed concern over 'having to 
take care' of the right people within the authorities. Considerable 
ev idence points to corruption at a l l l e v e l s of the bantustan 
bureaucracies.®^ Dewar e t a l (1984, pp.64-65) add that continual 
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changes in the structure of incent ives exacerbates admin is t ra t i ve 
problems f o r both the Development Corporations and indiv idual 
companies. Such changes, by altering the re la t i ve competitiveness of 
various centres, also contribute to the "general sense of uncertainty" 
among investors. The planned introduction of a tax holiday in Ciskei 
as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the standard incent ives i s i nd i ca t i v e of the 
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growing complexity of the system. 
(7) Po l i t i ca l Problems 
Most indus t ra l i s t s interv iewed, ant ic ipated few problems of a 
po l i t i ca l nature; both Transkei and KwaZulu were considered reasonably 
'safe ' in this respect. However, i t was acknowledged that po l i t i ca l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s were c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i k e l y to emerge in an 
'independent' t e r r i t o r y l i k e Transkei where local 'governments' are 
less dominated by Pretoria. The v i o l e n t confrontat ions between the 
Ciskeian author i t i e s and the township communities - notably in 
Mdantsane - in the past couple of years i s obviously worrying fo r 
investors who rely on the authorities for incentives and the townships 
Q7 for labour. 
(8) Local Market 
This f ac to r is of l i t t l e s i gn i f i c ance given that the proport ion of 
finished products sold to customers within the bantustans is generally 
very low (Table 10). However, where companies are presently dependent 
on local customers, a major concern is that bantustan markets - given 
their chronic dependence on migrant labour - are unstable with l imited 
32 
prospects for growth. Equally, while most companies considered public 
sector contracts to be l u c ra t i v e and genera l l y r e l i a b l e , there was 
speculation that the growth potential of this market is also l imited 
given the stated intention of the South African government to cut back 
on i t s f i s ca l handouts to the bantustans in the present recession, and 
introduce measures to contro l the i n e f f i c i e n t and corrupt use of 
public revenue by the bantustan authorities. 
(9) Other Problems 
( i ) Agglomeration economies and linkages: very few of the bantustan 
growth points have yet developed to a point where inter-industry 
linkages are s igni f icant and "lateral linkage' (the relocation of 
industries to growth points to take advantage of agglomeration 
e c o n o m i e s ) i s an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in e n c o u r a g i n g 
decent ra l i sa t i on . In our surveys, very few f i rms reported 
business of any kind within the growth points; what linkage there 
was being conf ined to minor sub-contract ing, repair work and 
se rv i c es . S imi lar resu l ts are reported by Dewar e t a l (1984, 
pp.44-49).®® Par t of the reason f o r t h i s may be tha t a 
r e l a t i v e l y l a rge share of industr ies in the growth points are 
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branch plants rather than autonomous operations. As Dewar et 
a l (1984, p.49) expla in ; 
"...because of the i r l a rge share of rout ine production 
processes and the lack of the i r own admin is t ra t i ve and 
research a c t i v i t i e s , branch plants very o f t en create low 
s k i l l and thus low paid jobs. Smaller branch plants show 
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more instabi l i ty in the face of macro-economic fluctuations 
because their headquarters tend to reduce employment f i r s t 
in the per ipheral branch plants. Further, branch plants 
tend to have l inkages over l a rger d is tances and there fo re 
make fewer reg ional purchases, have a smaller mu l t i p l i e r 
e f f e c t and contribute to leakage out of a region". 
In addition, although the state has claimed that the enticement 
of 'propuls ive ' industr ies to growth points i s an important 
pr ior i ty given the extensive multipl ier e f f e c t s they are alleged 
to induce, very few decentralised industries are of this type.100 
So, a l though Dav ies e t a l (1980, pp.8-9) have commented 
unfavourably on the "apparently underdeveloped capaci ty f o r 
forward and backward linkage generation" in the East London area, 
i t i s clear that this capacity is s igni f icant ly more developed in 
development points l i k e East London than in the bantustans. 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the f igures in Table 10, Davies et al 
(1980, Tables 2 and 3) found that, for East London companies, 26 
percent of manufactured output was sold within the c i t y while 27 
percent of inputs were derived local ly . 
( i i ) Housing Shortages: th i s i s an acute problem for white and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y black s t a f f in most bantustan growth points. 
Squatter settlements are beginning to emerge on the outskirts of 
the planned set t lements in l a rge IDP's such as I s i thebe and 
Butterworth and the undersupply of publ ic transport has become 
more of a problem as workers are forced to f ind accommodation 
further away from the f a c t o r i e s . In I s i thebe , f o r example, 
Ardington (1984, p.89) ca l cu la tes a shortage of about 3,000 
houses in Sundumbili Township where the present number is 
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( i i i )Land Ownership: restr ict ions prohibiting the purchase and hence 
mortgage bond financing of land in most bantustans (Ciskei is an 
e x c e p t i o n ) i s a l s o cons ide r ed a n e g a t i v e f a c t o r by some 
industrial ists (Ra tc l i f f e , 1979, p.404). 
Clearly, then, the bantustan growth points are seriously disadvantaged 
in many respects and the i r a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t investment depends 
ultimately upon the provision of incentives (superior to those of fered 
by their competitors) and the continuation of wide wage dispar i t ies 
10? 
with respect to the metropol i tan centres . ,U£- I t i s not surpr is ing , 
the r e f o r e , that the most successful growth po ints have been those 
s i tuated in ex i s t ing large centres or located on the metropol i tan 
per ipher ies . Hence, i f there i s any 'spontaneous' d r i ve towards 
decen t ra l i sa t i on i t w i l l not apply to growth points located deep in 
the bantustans, but to those s i tuated on the 'borders ' c lose to 1 (1? established industrial centres.' 
4. 'DEVEDOtMENmL' IMPACT ON THE RAWTUSTANS 
Whi ls t the new rhe tor i c s t resses the 'economic interdependence' of 
'whi te ' South A f r i c a and the bantustans, the 'development' of the 
lat ter into separate sub-economies remains a central object ive of the 
apartheid regime. Thus, i t i s f requent ly asserted that industr ia l 
decentralisation w i l l provide a means for 'developing' the bantustans. 
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This assertion is examined under the headings that fol low. Of course, 
such an exercise might be considered to be premised upon an acceptance 
of the divis ion of South Afr ica into autonomous po l i t i e s demarcated on 
r a c i a l l ines . However, our attempt to develop a c r i t i q u e of 
d ecen t ra l i sa t i on in these terms i s intended to demonstrate - in 
contrast to the o f f i c i a l l ine - that i t should be understood more as 
a form of e x p l o i t a t i o n , whereby super-cheap per iphera l labour is 
brought into production for the benefit of metropolitan capital. In 
addition, given that the future of decentralisation w i l l be largely a 
function of state intervention, any serious analysis of the programme 
w i l l have to consider what objectives decentralisation is supposed to 
rea l ise and what impact a fa i lure to meet these objectives is l ike l y 
to have on government policy. 
(1) Employment 
As outlined above, decentralisation has had very l i t l e impact upon the 
l e v e l of unemployment in the bantustans, absorbing - according to 
McCarthy (1982, p.238) - only about 7 percent of annual entrants to 
the labour fo rce . In addition, whereas Blausten (1976, p.220) has 
argued that "there is simply no need" for cheap labour since "the tax 
concessions on wages make i t unnecessary", wages are extremely low and 
very l i t t l e f i l t e r s down to the rural areas surrounding the industrial 
parks. In I s i thebe , f o r example, wh i l s t i t i s true that the 
development of industry there has "had a dramatic e f f e c t upon 
household incomes" - average household income in Is i thebe equal led 
R412 per month compared to R109 in the nearby rural area of Nkandla -
and that "local employment opportunities have wrought enormous changes 
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in the l i v e s of both the l o ca l population and of those who have come 
into the area to take up employment", some 45 percent of these 
104 households survive below the relevant HSL. Furthermore, only 7,5 
percent of total household income is remitted to the surrounding rural 
105 area by households in Isithebe. 
The extent of the 'problem' i s h igh l ighted by the s i m p l i s t i c 
accountirq exercise in Table 11. Essentially, this demonstrates that 
i f considerat ion is given to a l l sources of income accruing to 
Transkeian households, roughly 80 000 jobs would have to be 
immediately created in the manufacturing sector to push the households 
up to the 1984 HSL.106 Th i s compares to a t o t a l of 15 000 
manufacturing jobs in Transkei l a t e in 1984. In addi t ion , wh i l e the 
Transkeian Development Corporation p r o j e c t s an employment creat ion 
rate of 5 000 jobs per year in i t s most recent Three Year Plan, there 
are about 25 000 Transkeians entering the j ob market every year . 1 0 7 
S i m i l a r l y in C i ske i , whereas a t o t a l of just under 20 000 manu-
factur ing jobs have been created in ass is ted industr ies , there are 
108 some 37 000 entrants to the labour force every year. 
F i n a l l y , w h i l s t i t i s argued by the a u t h o r i t i e s that the 
decentralisation of industry w i l l generate a mult ipl ier e f f e c t within 
the bantustan labour market by upgrading sk i l l s to artisan leve ls and 
by giving locals the opportunity to practice professionally, develop 
managerial s k i l l s or set up the i r own businesses, v i r t u a l l y a l l the 
jobs created fo r l o ca l s by the companies that took part in our 
inves t i ga t i ons were unski l led. Very few employed l o ca l s in a 
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professional or managerial capacity, nor did they appear to have any 
intention of doing so, despite the fact that most managers claimed to 
have experienced d i f f i c u l t i e s in prising competent whites away from 
their jobs in the c i t i es . Even within the companies which were part 
or wholly owned by the Development Corporations - where some pressure 
i s appl ied to p lace l o ca l s in managerial pos i t i ons - there was a 
tendency to reserve s ens i t i v e pos i t ions fo r expat r ia tes . Some 
companies had init iated training schemes for black artisans where such 
schemes are subsidised but most were prejudiced towards automation and 
de-skil led assembly-line production (see Table 12). 
Also important to discussions of employment creation is the question 
of labour in tens i ty . Planners have envisaged that the d e c en t r a l i -
sation programme would engender a type of dual ist ic economy wherein 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s w i l l be p r i m a r i l y based in the 
metropolitan centres with labour-intensive industries induced to the 
periphery. According to Legassick (1974, p.17), then, by the l a t e 
1960's "... a dichotomy was spe l led out of the forms of industr ia l 
growth: at the existing growth points capital intensif ication was to 
be encouraged, and near the reserves labour- in tens ive industry." 
Obviously, the impera t i ve to e s t a b l i s h such a d ichotomy was 
e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l . On the one hand, i t was thought that the 
development of labour-intensive industries in the periphery would help 
s t a b i l i s e the in f lux contro l system and add l eg i t imacy to the 
bantustan po l i t i ca l structures. Conversely, "... a decreasing number 
of Blacks would be required in industr ies s i tuta ted in and around 
White urban areas" (Legassick, 1974, p.28). However, the c rea t ion 
under apartheid of massive inequalit ies in labour supply and hence the 
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cost of labour, means that there is a lso a s i g n i f i c a n t economic 
imperat ive favouring a reg iona l d i v i s i o n of forms of production. 
Hence, leading industrial ists have recently stressed their support for 
some spatial d i f f e rent ia t ion of the forms of economic growth. 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , severa l studies have noted di f ferences in 
leve ls of capital intensity between growth points and the metropolitan 
centres . However, the data published to date are not s u f f i c i e n t to 
pinpoint the determinants of these d i f f e r e n c e s . For instance, one 
would have to consider whether; (a) those industr ies that have 
decentralised were those that were r e la t i ve l y labour intensive with 
respect to their competitors - and decentralised in order to retain or 
to improve the i r compet i t iveness; or (b) industr ies became more 
labour - in tens ive in the process of decen t ra l i s ing to take further 
advantage of labour subsidies ; or (c) l a rge industr ies , having 
disaggregated their production processes into operations that need not 
be in close spatial proximity to each other, have decentralised those 
operat ions that are r e l a t i v e l y labour intensive with respect to the 
others. Tomlinson et a l (1984a, p.10), for example, reported that 81 
percent of bantustan industries in their survey considered themselves 
more labour intensive (with respect to their sector as a whole) while 
16 percent described themselves as being more c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e 
(suggesting type a or b above). S i m i l a r l y , our comparison of 
industries of equivalent sizes within one sector (clothing) suggests 
that metropolitan companies are markedly more capital intensive (mean 
c a p i t a l per worker = R4 103) than those in bantustan growth points 
(R2 545), although distributional di f ferences between the two samples 
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are not s ta t i s t i ca l l y s igni f icant. On the other hand, 51 percent 
of the companies we interviewed in Isithebe and Butterworth indicated 
that their techniques were more labour-intensive than those that had 
been employed by themselves or were being employed by a parent company 
in the metropol i tan centres , wh i l e only 14 percent int imated the 
reverse (suggesting type b and/or c , a b o v e ) } ^ Neverthe less , i t 
would appear that di f ferences in mean capital intensity are primarily 
the product of a sectoral bias in the growth points towards the more 
labour in tens ive industr ies such as t ex t i l es and clothing.112 Thus, 
Stanwix (1984, p.229) notes that jobs in I s i thebe ' s t e x t i l e and 
c lo th ing sector were the cheapest to es tab l i sh (on average R6 600 
each) compared, for example, to the fabricated metal products sector 
112 where they cost about R25 000. 
However, wh i l s t per ipheral l oca t ions are unlikely to attract highly 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e operat ions (par t ly because of the i r needs fo r 
specialised services and sk i l l s and partly because incentives w i l l not 
be approved i f the cost per job to the local Development Corporation 
exceeds R20 000), they w i l l attract highly mechanised industries which 
have desk i l l ed the i r production processes. Thus, according to 
McCarten (1983) there has been a more rapid growth of the cap i t a l 
component (mechanised p l an t ) than the labour component in 
manufacturing industry within the Border, Ciskei and Southern Transkei 
region in the past f i v e years; the capital/labour rat io increasing by 
16 percent between 1979 and 1982 and 21 percent between 1982 and 1984. 
Similarly, the marked bias towards the employment of unskilled labour 
in bantustan industries (Table 12) may be indicative of trends towards 
the l o c a t i o n o f h i g h l y d e s k i l l e d a spec t s of p roduc t i on in 
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decentralised areas. Hence, Glaser (1983, p.20) is led to remark that 
"... what i s ce r ta in i s that the labour processes establ ished in 
decentra l i sed industr ies have by no means been consistently labour-
113 intensive". 
Further speculat ion on th is question w i l l a lso have to consider 
poss ib l e changes in the l e v e l of wage subsidies. Given that th is 
appears to be the most a t t r a c t i v e of the various incent ives (Table 
13), i t obviously contributes very s igni f i cant ly to trends towards the 
decen t ra l i sa t i on of l abour- in tens ive forms of production. Hence, 
several companies in our surveys suggested that labour intensity would 
dec l ine p rec ip i t ous l y once wage subsidies exp i re and/or labour 
p roduc t i v i t y improves. I t i s l i k e l y , then, assuming that the s ta te 
cannot continue subsidis ing a l l decent ra l i sed industr ies on a 
permanent basis, that a fraction w i l l be unable to res ist the general 
pressure to f o l l o w the metropol i tan trend of increasing c a p i t a l -
intensi ty . 1 1 4 
F i n a l l y , ce r ta in aspects of government p o l i c y appear somewhat 
ambiguous i f i t s intention is to promote the development of labour-
intensive production in decentralised areas. For example, whilst the 
s ta te has f i xed a c e i l i n g on publ ic investment to deter highly 
capital- intensive industries from decentralising, i t has at the same 
time attempted to en t i ce r e l a t i v e l y c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e 'propuls ive ' 
industries to growth points because of the powerful mult ipl ier e f f e c t s 
they are thought to generate. In addition, whilst wage subsidies do 
seem to be the most at tract ive of the incentives, the entire package 
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does not appear to be aimed at par t i cu lar types of industry or 
spec i f ic forms of production but is applied blanket-fashion across the 
e n t i r e manufacturing sector . Indeed, comparing the old 1981/82 
incentive package to that introduced in Apri l 1982, i t i s possible to 
de t ec t a s l i gh t s h i f t in weight ings favouring the more c a p i t a l -
intensive industries. In the 1981/82 schedule, for instance, 'labour-
o r i en t ed ' , ' c ap i t a l o r i ented ' , and 'neutral ' incentives accounted for 
30,2 percent, 26,2 percent and 43,6 percent of non-recoverable costs 
to the South African government; equivalent f igures for 1982/83 were 
17,1 percent, 21 percent and 61,9 percent which r e f l e c t an 18,7 
percent increase in the value of ' labour' incent ives compared to a 
68,1 percent increase for ' c a p i t a l ' . ^ Further, wage subsidies apply 
fo r 7 years, whilst interest concessions on loan capital and rentals 
of land and buildings are val id for 10 years. 
(2) The Regional Multiplier 
Any impact that indust r ia l decen t ra l i sa t i on might have on the 
'development' of the bantustans is also seriously undermined by what 
Toml inson (1983, p.544) terms the "metropo l i tan d r i f t of the 
mu l t i p l i e r e f f e c t of investments in the industr ia l development 
points . " The share of the ' r eg iona l m u l t i p l i e r ' (the e f f e c t of 
output, incomes and employment of recurrent new investment in a 
region) that is captured local ly within the bantustans is suppressed 
by several factors^®; 
( i ) 'backward' and ' forward ' l inkages within the bantustan economies 
are severely l imited.1 1 7 The results of our investigation into 
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th i s aspect of the mu l t i p l i e r are shown in Table 10. In each 
case, the proportions of plant/manufactures and serv i ce inputs 
(ca lculated by value) drawn from the l o ca l economy ( ' forward 
linkages') are negl igible. Most inputs, as one would expect, are 
imported from the metropolitan areas of South A f r i ca ,^® whilst 
overseas companies a lso r e ce i v e a s i g n i f i c a n t share of the 
business. Equally, the proportions of raw materials (by value) 
der ived from the l oca l economies ('backward l inkages ' ) are 
119 insigni f icant. 
Such leakage i s exacerbated by severa l f a c t o r s , the most 
important of which appear to be; (a) the r e l a t i v e sca rc i t y of 
'propulsive' industries at the growth points; (b) the small s ize 
of most IDP's which suppresses the development of agglomeration 
economies and the emergence of ' l a t e r a l l i n k a g e ' ( c ) the 
concentrat ion of decentra l i sed industr i es on the bantustan 
per ipher ies which f a c i l i t a t e s the re tent ion of metropol i tan 
l inkages; (d) the f ac t that the ma j o r i t y of decentra l i sed 
industries are branch plants which are generally less inclined to 
develop local linkages, ^^ and; (e) the underdevelopment of the 
periphery (lack of raw materials, poor infrastructure, scarcity 
of local capitals) . 
( i i ) ' t r i ck l e -down ' e f f e c t s - such as the development of commercial 
o u t l e t s to tap increased purchasing power in the area (from 
manufacturing sa la r i e s and wages) - are circumscribed by the 
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leakage of purchasing power out the region and depressed by 
the low wages paid to workers. 
An ind ica t i on of th i s i s the rapid development of small 'whi te ' 
towns located on the bantustan 'borders'. Surveys of businesses 
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in Eshowe (bordering KwaZulu) and Kokstad (Transkei) , f o r 
example, show how they have 'boomed' in recent years; 53 percent 
o f bus inesses in Eshowe and 42 pe r c en t in Kokstad were 
es tab l ished in or a f t e r 1975 (22 and 26 percent in or a f t e r 
1980), while 41 percent and 49 percent respectively had 'de f in i te 
plans' to expand in the immediate future. This growth has 
occurred primarily as a result of an increase in the purchasing 
power of their markets across the 'borders'; both towns are now 
heavily dependent on black consumers commuting from Transkei and 
KwaZulu, a dependency which had deepened over the past f i v e years 
and is expected to deepen even further in the future . In the 
case of the Eshowe sample, an average 56 percent of annual 
turnover was accounted fo r by shoppers crossing from KwaZulu 
(worth R28 mil l ion in 1982); comparable figures for Kokstad were 
71 percent and R87 mil l ion. 
( i i i ) L o c a l Ownership and P r o f i t Shar ing : w h i l s t most of the 
Development Corporations have contributed equity cap i t a l to 
a s s i s t decentra l i sed industr ies , none are in a pos i t i on to 
invest in more than a few companies at a time. The scarc i t y of 
managerial talent and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of mobilising capital are 
44 
the major l imitations. Moreover, a l l of these bodies have found 
i t occasionally necessary to se l l o f f some of their holdings to 
p r i va t e in t e res t s . Thus, the l e v e l of ' l o c a l ownership' i s 
presently insubstantial. In our survey, 93 percent of Isithebe 
industries were fu l l y ' foreign owned' while the leve l of ' foreign 
ownership' averaged 99 percent; the equivalent figures for Umtata 
and Butterworth were 68 percent and 77 percent. The indications 
are that wh i l s t the Development Corporations w i l l continue to 
seek equi ty pa r t i c i pa t i on in ce r ta in companies, most w i l l be 
ma jo r i t y or f u l l y owned by ' f o r e i g n ' in t e res ts . C l ea r l y , th is 
has important imp l i ca t ions f o r p r o f i t sharing since p r i va t e 
companies are under no obligation to remit any share of pro f i t s 
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or d i v i d e n d s to t h e i r hos ts beyond company t a x a t i o n . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the bantustan governments are committed to 
encourag ing p r i v a t e inves tment "by assuring that p r i va te 
interests w i l l not be nationalised and that their ab i l i t y to make 
p r o f i t s and repa t r i a t e div idends w i l l not be a r b i t r a r i l y 
r e s t r i c t e d and by minimising the use of d i r e c t cont ro l s of a 
1 ?Ii 
s o c i a l i s t i c nature". Moreover, there seems l i t t l e prospect 
that host 'governments' w i l l be able to ex t rac t concessions on 
p ro f i t - sha r ing from assisted companies in the future. Even i f 
such p o l i c i e s were implemented at a l l growth po ints (so that 
inves tors could not simply switch operat ions to a l t e r n a t i v e 
s i t e s ) i t i s un l ike ly that many companies would be prepared to 
invest on these terms. Indeed, several companies in our samples 
were quite host i le to local participation preferring to have, as 
one respondent put i t , "as l i t t l e to do with them as possible". 
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In sum, then, in sharp contrast to the optimistic estimates issued by 
1 ?fi 
government bodies, most studies demonstrate that the reg iona l 
mu l t i p l i e r generated by decentral ised industry within the bantustan 
'economies' i s of extremely l imited dimensions. Furthermore, given 
the general impoverishment of the reserves and the absence of 
agglomeration economies at bantustan growth points, there seems l i t t l e 
reason to b e l i e v e that a larger reg ional mu l t i p l i e r or ' s e l f -
sustaining growth' can be realised. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is abundantly clear from this and other studies that "... attempts 
to combat problems of economic underdevelopment in the poorer areas 
through indust r ia l decentra l i sa t ion programmes almost by de f in i t ion 
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w i l l f a i l " . Hence, from his analysis of the Ciskeian situation, 
Ward (1980, p.17) argues persuasively that: 
"... the l o g i c of the growth centre approach, with i t s emphasis 
on promoting dynamic internal economic change, is fundamentally, 
inconsistent. I t is in conf l i c t with the necessity to meet the 
needs of those l e f t behind in the economic growth process. 
Indeed, i t may well be that growth centres succeed only when they 
evo l ve without d i r e c t government in tervent ion . I f an area has 
fa i led to develop without outside help or o f f i c i a l support then 
there would appear to be l i t t l e reason for assuming that i t w i l l 
ever succeed as a growth centre as a r esu l t of d e l i b e r a t e 
government act ion. There is even l ess reason for be l i e v ing -
especially in a 'homeland' context - that there w i l l be desirable 
'spread' e f f e c t s " . 
However, i f one would be co r r ec t to d ismiss decen t ra l i sa t i on as a 
means for 'developing' the bantustans, one would be wrong to ignore i t 
as a process per se in the South African situation. Although one must 
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t r ea t the data with caut ion, there are strong ind icat ions that 
decen t ra l i sa t i on i s acce l e ra t ing . Obviously, the prov is ion o f 
incentives is central to this process but other factors (themselves, 
p a r t i a l l y a funct ion of apartheid po l i c y ) - s p e c i f i c i a l l y , wide 
reg iona l i n equa l i t i e s in l e v e l s of labour supply and trade union 
organisat ion - a lso encourage ce r ta in f r a c t i o n s of cap i t a l to 
decentralise. What has been argued, then, is that a regional div is ion 
of forms of production may be emerging in South Africa to help improve 
the in ternat iona l compet i t iveness of certain types of manufacturing 
industry. Thus, i t may be product ive to d i r e c t a t t ent ion away from 
Y 
the issue of bantustan industralisation towards a consideration of the 
ways in which an 'international div is ion of labour' i s developing at a 
128 regional leve l in South Afr ica. 
On the other hand, since i t i s d i f f i c u l t to disaggregate the e f f e c t of 
incent ives (and d i s incen t i v es ) from other imperat ives towards 
decen t ra l i sa t i on , one might s t i l l argue that decen t ra l i sa t i on is 
essential ly an a r t i f i c i a l process and w i l l remain a function of state 
subsidisation. However, we could argue (perhaps prematurely) that the 
p r e s en t p a t t e r n o f d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n c o n t a i n s a more or l e s s 
'spontaneous' component that could be sustained i f incent ives were 
gradually reduced or phased out altogether, but which is confined to a 
r e l a t i v e l y sma l l number o f g rowth p o i n t s w i th p o s i t i o n a l , 
i n f ras t ruc tura l and agglomeration advantages. Most of these w i l l 
the re f o re be located in establ ished 'whi te ' towns or near the 
metropolitan peripheries, and most bantustan growth points except some 
of those perched on the 'borders' w i l l be excluded. 
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Of course, th is br ings us back again to the question of government 
po l i cy . Notwithstanding the o f f i c i a l rhe to r i c that now stresses 
"economic interdependence1 between 'whi te ' South A f r i c a and the 
bantustans and the suggestion of a trend towards a rationalisation of 
the decentralisation programme, the 'development' of the bantustans as 
dist inct sub-economies is s t i l l central to the government's regional 
po l i cy . Arguments that the establishment of growth points cannot 
provide a means for realising this objective are in fact unlikely to 
deter the government i f i t s true purpose is simply to keep blacks out 
o f the c i t i e s and add l e g i t i m a c y to the bantustan p o l i t i c a l 
structures. Hence, i f the economic fo rces that now seem to be 
favouring decentralisation are perceived by the government to con f l i c t 
too sharply with i t s v i s i on of 'separate development', new attempts 
may be made to interfere with 'spontaneous' patterns of investment. As 
a r e su l t , any analys is of decent ra l i sa t i on in the South Afr ican 
context that might seek to emphasise the forces impelling a regional 
d iv is ion in forms of production cannot underestimate the interests of 
apartheid ideology. At the same time, i t w i l l have to assess the 
possible impact of negative reactions to decentralisation policy among 
metropolitan capitals who resent having to underwrite the programme 
through corporate tax and who fear compet i t ion from subsidised 
industries.1 2 9 
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Figure 1. P r o j e c t s es tab l ished and employment created under the 
decentralisation prograrane, 1975-1984. 
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Sources : For growth points in 'white ' South A f r i c a and the ' s e l f -
governing' bantustans; Decentralisation Board reports, 1981, 
1982/83, and 1983/84. F i gu res f o r the 'independent' 
bantustans (sometimes inconsistent) were obtained from the 
various Development Corporations. 
Note : Figures fo r 1982/83 and 1983/84 are es t imates assuming an 
average 'drop-out ' rate of 50 percent across-the-board on 
'approved' p ro j ec t s . I f a l l ' approved ' p r o j e c t s were 
established, the f igures would be 908 (projects) and 84 992 
(employment) in 1982/83, and 1411 (pro j ec ts ) and 103 064 
(employment) in 1983/84. 
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Figure 2. P r o j e c t s "approved" under the decen t ra l i s a t i on programme, 
1975-1981 : employment actually created against anployment 
projected.1 
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Note 
Re-worked from Dewar et al (1984), p.69. 
Figures exclude the 'independent' bantustans from the dates 
on which they became 'independent' (1976 for Transkei, 1977 
for Eophuthatswana, 1979 for Venda, and 1981 for Ciskei) 
F igures l a t e r than 1981 are not yet a va i l ab l e s ince the 
Decentra l i sa t ion Board a l lows i n d u s t r i a l i s t s a two year 
'grace per iod ' to set up the i r f a c t o r i e s . Thus, p r o j e c t s 
'approved' in 1982 are g iven un t i l the end of 1984 to 
materialise; see Decentralisation Board (1984), p.13. 
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Figure 3. Concentration of decen t ra l i sa t i on a c t i v i t y , 1982/83 and 
1983/84.1 
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Source : Computed from Decentralisation Board data (1983, pp. 39-44; 
1984, pp.21 -25) . 
Is Data refer to growth points in 'white' South Afr ica and the 
' s e l f - gove rn ing ' bantustans. Comparable f i gures fo r the 
'independent' bantustans could not be obtained. 
Note: Index of concentrat ion ( I ) = 0.70 (p ro j ec ts 1982/83), 0.81 
(employment 1982/83), 0.72 (pro jec ts 1983/84), and 0.86 
(employment 1983/84). These figures suggest a trend towards 
increasing concentration. 
xx 
Figure 4. The l o ca t i ona l s t ructure of manufacturing employment in 
South Afr ica , 1972-1984. 
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Sources : Data up to 1981 (excluding the 'independent' bantustans) 
from Dewar e t a l (1984), p.70. Figures (a lso excluding the 
'independent' bantustans) up to 1984 ( f i r s t six months) were 
derived from 'Short-term economic ind ica tors ' , S t a t i s t i c a l 
News Release P.17 (Pretoria : Central Stat is t i ca l Services, 
October 26th 1984). Figures f o r growth po ints in South 
Afr ica and the 'self-governing' bantustans from 1981 to 1984 
were derived from communications with the Decentralisation 
Board. Figures fo r growth points in the 'independent' 
bantustans (required from the dates on which they became 
'independent'; see Figure 2, note 1) were obtained from the 
respective Development Corporations. 
Note: Analysis of these figures is made somewhat problematic by 
yearly changes in the number of growth points. 
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Figure 5. State expenditure on decentralisation incentives. 
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Sources : For growth po ints in 'whi te ' South A f r i c a and the ' s e l f -
governing ' bantustans; 'Homeland incent ives to cost Govt 
R500m', Rand Dai ly Mai l , October 4th 1984. Figures and 
est imates f o r the 'independent' bantustans were obtained 
fran their Development Corporations. 
Note: 50 percent of the costs of incentives in the bantustans are 
borne by the bantustan author i t i es . However, th i s s t i l l 
represents an indirect cost to the South African government, 
given the bantustans' f i s ca l dependence on the Republic. 
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Table 1. Declared Growth Points in 1984 
'White' 'Self-Governing' 'Independent' 
SA Bantustans Bantustans Totals 
Industrial Development Points1 24 10 10 44 
Deconcentration Points1 7 3 2 12 
Other Development Points1 48 10 - 58 
•Ad Hoc' cases2 71 - - 71 
Totals '150 23 12 185 
Source: Decentralisation Board (1984, pp.21-25) 
1: Subject to amendment (severa l others in ea r l y planning stages 
have yet to be declared) 
2: These are granted incentives on a year to year basis. 
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Table 3. Metropo l i tan manufacturing companies seriously considering 
expansion or relocation in a new area in the next f i v e years 
: expected location of investment. 
Cape 
Town EW Durban 
Port Elizabeth/ 
Uitenhage N % 
Considering investment 3 33 34 5 75 35,7 
Not considering investment 24 61 23 27 135 64,3 
2101 
Location 
Another urban area 3 12 11 3 29 39,7 
Deconcentration Point - 6 7 2 15 20,5 
Industrial Development 
Point - 12 14 - 26 35,6 
Other - 2 1 - 3 4,1 
1 3 2 
Source : Black (1984) 
1: A total of 218 manufacturing companies were interviewed; 8 did 
not respond to this question. 
2: 2 responses were unrecorded. 
Table 4. Anticipated employment growth rates (over next f i v e years) in 
the metropolitan centres and two bantustan growth points. 
Metropolitan Isithebe/ 
sample Butterworth 
(N=212) (N=37) 
Av. % growth p.a. 
Negative 6,1 2,7 
No change 25,5 10,8 
1 - 2 % 17,5 5,4 
3 - 4 % 18,9 8,1 
5 - 6 % 12,7 8,1 
Over 6% 19,3 64,9 
Source : Black (1984) 
Note: X 2 analysis based on the raw data shows that 
the two d i s t r i bu t i ons are s i a n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t at oC= 0,001 (df =5; X r = 33,16) 
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Table 5. 'Approved' app l i ca t i on f o r d ecen t ra l i s a t i on , 1982/84 
number of projects and jobs 
Projects Jobs Average 
No. of 
Jobs per 
N % N % Project 
'Independent' bantustans 352 
'Self-governing' bantustans 481 
Border/midd1e-hierarchy 
white towns 1 002 
'White' Deconcentration 
Points 314 
'Ad hoc cases' 170 
Totals 2 319 
15,2 52 800 28,1 150 
20,7 57 734 30,7 120 
43,2 48 753 25,9 49 
13,5 18 797 10,0 60 
7,3 9 972 5,3 59 
188 056 
Sources: For the 'independent' bantustans, f igures were supplied by 
the Development Corporations. For the rest; Decentralisaton 
Board (1983, Annexure B; 1984, Annexure B). 
Note: 'Drop-out'rates are thought to be higher in the bantustans. 
Discussions with the Development Corporations suggest a rate 
between 60 to 70 percent compared with 40 to 50 percent for 
other growth points (see Figure 2). Assuming an average 
'drop-out ' r a t e of 65 percent fo r the bantustans and 45 
percent fo r 'white ' South A f r i c a , about 39 000 jobs are 
l i k e l y to be establ ished in the former and about 42 600 in 
the la t te r . 
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Table 6. Reasons for decentralisation among bantustan industries 
Umtata/ Tomlinson et a l ' s 
Reason Butterworth Isithebe (1984) survey 
Composite index1 and rank 
Incentives and 
assistance 2,61 (1) 2,80 (1) 2,62 (1) 
Cheap/plentiful 
labour 2,29 (2) 2,37 (2) 2,44 (2) 
Proximity to Markets 1,50 (3) 1,73 (4) 2,06 (3) 
'Push' factors 
( spec i f i ca l l y , Environment 
Planning Act) 1,36 (4) 1,90 (3) 
Others 1,07 (5) • 1,40 (5) 
Sources: Own survey of Umtata, Butterworth and I s i thebe (Wel l ings , 
1984); Tomlinson et al (1984a, pp.13,16 and 22). 
1: Computed by coding 'very important', 'marginally important' 
and 'not important' responses 3,2, and 1 r e s p e c t i v e l y and 
averaging out over the number of responses. In Tomlinson e t 
a l ' s su rvey , r esponses were c a t e g o r i s e d ' important ' , 
'considered' or ' i rrelevant ' . Here, they have been re-coded 
3,2 and 1 fo r the purposes of comparison. 
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Table 7. Metropo l i tan survey : f a c t o r s causing f i r m s t o consider 
r e l o c a t i o n or expansion in a new area in the next f i v e 
years. 
Moving to: 
Another Deconcentration Industrial Total 
urban Point (N=14) Development 
Factor area (N=28) 
Composite index1 
Point (N=26) 
Ava i lab i l i t y of unskilled/ 
semi-skilled labour 0,07 0,28 0,65 
Ava i lab i l i t y of sk i l l ed 
labour 0,25 0,21 -
Ava i lab i l i t y of anci l lary 
services 0,07 0,07 -
'Push' Factors (eg. 
Environment Planning Act) 0,07 - 0,08 
Incentives _ 1,29 1,42 
Proximity to Markets 1,07 0,50 0,23 
Transport Costs 0,11 0,14 0,04 
Geographical su i tab i l i t y 0,36 0,07 0,23 
Others eg. rat ional isat ion 0,29 0,14 
" 
Source: Black (1984) 
1: Computed by coding 'prime reasons' 2 and 'secondary reasons' 1. 
Note: bold typeface indicates s igni f icant factors. 
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Table 11. Transkei : jobs required in manufacturing industry in 1984. 
Resident population in 1984 3,08 mil l ion1 
Number of Households 46" 0002 
HSL 2055 p .a . 3 
Total Household Incane Required at HSL R 960 mil l ion 
Sources of Income 
Migrant Remittances R 279 mil l ion4 
Subsistence Agriculture R 154 mi l l ion 5 
Pensions R 37 mil l ion6 
Wages R 200 mil l ion7 
Total R 670 mil l ion 
Short fal l R 290 mi l l ion 
80 000 jobs at average annual wage of R14008 
and multipl ier of 1,50 
Sources: 
1. Resident populat ion i s g iven as 2,94 m i l l i o n in 1982 wi th an 
annual growth ra t e of 2,4 percent (Osmond Lange e t a l , 1982, 
p. 14) 
2. Average household s ize = 6,6 (Osmond Lange et a l , 1982, p.138) 
3. HSL i s e s s e n t i a l l y rural f o r Transkei; th i s f i g u r e i s der ived 
from the Umzimkulu reg ion (R1644 p.a. in 1982 and i n f l a t e d by 
11,8 percent up to 1984; May (1984), p.67). 
4. This i s p ro j ec ted from Abedian's (1983, p.268) 1980 f i g u r e of 
R229,5 m i l l i on . 
5. Westcot t (1977, p.139) ca l cu la tes that approximately 16 percent 
of the HSL may be met by subsistence agriculture in Transkei. 
6. Calculated from May (1984, p.71) 
7. About 190 000 r e c e i v e wages in Transke i ; 'Transkei Spec ia l 
Report', Rand Da i l y Mai l , August 30th 1984, p.l. Hie income from 
this i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain but Barry (1982, p.126) suggests a 
f i g u r e of around R170 m i l l i o n f o r 1979 - probably around R200 
mi l l ion in 1984. 
8. Approximated from survey data. 
9. Based on Gavin Maasdorp's comments in , 'Decent ra l i sa t i on : the 
business view', F inanc ia l Mai l , September 28th 1984, p.46. 
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Table 12. Sk i l l breakdowns in manufacturing industry 
Metropolitan Isithebe/ 
Centres Butterworth 
Category (N=218) (N=39) 
Av.% 
Managerial and professional 5,5 2,7 
Cler ica l 9,0 3,1 
Skil led 12,0 5,9 
Semi-skilled 39,5 34,1 
Unskilled 34,0 54,0 
Source: Black (1984) 
Note: X2 analysis based on the raw scores shows that the two 
distributions are s i gn i f i c an t l y d i f f e r e n t at«-=0,001 
(df=4; r^ 2=44,2) 
Table 13. Evaluation of incentives 
Metropolitan Isithebe 
Centres Butterworth 
Incentives (N=32)1 (N=31) 
Composite index2 and rank 
Wage subsidy 3,28 (1) 2,81 (1) 
Rental subsidy 1,00 (3) 1,26 (2) 
Interest subsidy 1,47 (2) 1,16 (3) 
Road transportation 0,63 (6) 0,87 (4) 
Railage rebate 0,78 (5) 0,83 (5) 
Training rebate 0,84 (4) 0,77 (6) 
Relocation allowance 0,44 (7) 0,42 (7) 
Source: Black (1984) 
1; Companies that had located a subsidiary in a decentralised 
area. 
2: In this survey, respondents were asked to rank the f i r s t 
four of a l i s t of 12 incent ives in order of importance. 
These ranks were assigned scores of 4,3,2,1 and 0. 
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